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WHEN IS A USER NOT A "USER"?
FINDING THE PROPER ROLE FOR
REPUBLICATION LIABILITY ON THE INTERNET
James P. Jenal*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the originator of a defamatory statement is the usual
defendant in an action for libel, courts have long held that "one who repeats
or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he
had originally published it."' Nevertheless, the common law has
recognized a distinction between the liability to be assigned to initial
publishers, such as book or newspaper publishers which routinely exercise
editorial control over the content of their publications, and distributors,
such as bookstores and newsstands which serve as mere conduits for
providing content to the public.2
The Internet served to blur that distinction and early cases considering
the extent of liability for republication of defamatory content over the
Internet created great uncertainty.3  Congress responded by enacting the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), which immunizes a "provider or
user of an interactive computer service" from being "treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
* Mr. Jenal is a Counsel in the Litigation Department of O'Melveny & Myers LLP and an
Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Mr. Jenal gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Review, including Marisa R. Sarnoff, Silvia J. Esparza, and David J. Sarnoff. Mr. Jenal
especially acknowledges the patience and counsel of Leena M. Sheet, without whose
perseverance and dedication this article would not have been published.
1. Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §578 (1977)); see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972);
Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1979) (offering historical examples of how
speech-makers were not immune from liability for re-publishing libelous remarks).
2. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
3. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 135; see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv's
Co., 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), both discussed infra starting at Part II.
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content provider."4 Early cases interpreting the CDA's so-called "Good
Samaritan" provisions attempted to determine the extent of that immunity,
but always in the context of immunity for Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") like America Online, Incorporated ("AOL").5
Recently, however, a case-Barrett v. Rosenthal6-has arisen that
focuses squarely on the CDA' s apparent protection of users who knowingly
republish defamatory content on the Internet.7 But the extent of that
protection is necessarily a more nuanced, and as yet unanswered, question
than the blanket immunity courts have decided Congress intended to grant
ISPs. Understanding the many roles assumed by users of interactive
computer services-some which neither need nor merit the CDA's
protection-is the key to understanding the extent of the CDA's grant of
immunity for users who intentionally republish libelous content.
Achieving that understanding requires a brief review of the cases leading
up to the passage of the CDA, an examination of the cultural context and
purposes expressed by Congress in passing the CDA, and a critical analysis
of the major cases interpreting the CDA as applied to ISPs, and now to
users. Two conclusions emerge from that analysis: first, that user roles
form a continuum that directly correlates with the appropriateness of
immunity under the CDA, and second, that cases such as Barrett can only
be properly decided by determining where on that continuum of roles the
user in question lies.
II. EARLY LIBEL ANALYSIS AS APPLIED To THE NASCENT INTERNET
A. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.
The differences between true publishers and distributors were first
examined in the online context in Cubby.8 Back in 1990, CompuServe was
a successful, subscription-based provider of online computer forums
covering a host of different subject areas, including a Journalism Forum.
9
Although CompuServe established editorial and technical standards for the
4. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
5. See generally Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998),
both discussed infra starting at Part Ill.
6. Barrett v. Rosenthal, (Alameda Sup. Ct., No. 833021-5, July 25, 2001), rev'd inpart, 114
Cal. App. 4th 1379 (1st Dist. 2003).
7. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1379.
8. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 138.
9. Id. at 137.
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Journalism Forum, it contracted with a third-party entity, Cameron
Communications, Inc. ("CCI"), to "manage, review, create, delete, edit and
otherwise control the contents' of the Journalism Forum" in accordance
with those standards. 10 In turn, CCI contracted with a number of content
providers for material to publish, including Don Fitzpatrick Associates
("DFA"), which produced a newsletter known as Rumorville USA
("Rumorville")."1 CompuServe had no contractual relationship with DFA,
nor did it have any "opportunity to review Rumorville's contents before
DFA upload[ed] [them] into CompuServe's computer banks, from which
[they were] immediately available to approved [CompuServe]
subscribers."1 2 Moreover,
CompuServe receive[d] no part of any fees that DFA charge[d]
for access to Rumorville, nor did CompuServe compensate DFA
for providing Rumorville to the Journalism Forum; the
compensation CompuServe receive[d] for making Rumorville
available to its subscribers was the standard online time usage
and membership fees charged to all [CompuServe] subscribers,
regardless of the information services they use[d]. CompuServe
maintain[ed] that, before this action was filed, it had no notice of
any complaints about the contents of the Rumorville publication
or about DFA.
13
Plaintiffs contended that a series of statements appeared in the
Rumorville newsletter in April of 1990 which were false and defamatory,
and that in providing the posting service for those messages, CompuServe
acted as a publisher.1 4  CompuServe contended that it was merely a
distributor, and that without notice of the allegedly defamatory content it
could not be held liable. 5 The court agreed with CompuServe, describing
CompuServe as:
in essence an electronic, for-profit library that carries a vast
number of publications and collects usage and membership fees
from its subscribers in return for access to the publications ....
CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a
publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand,
and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 138-39.
15. Id. at 138.
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statements than it would be for any other distributor to do so. 
16
The court's acknowledgement of the infeasibility of CompuServe-or
any other ISP-to provide comprehensive, pre-posting editorial review of
subscriber-submitted content reflected an accurate grasp of a key point.
For ISPs to survive as providers of online forums, there would have to be
limits on their liability for the flood of content produced by their millions
of subscribers. 
1 7
Although Cubby seemed to establish the proper limit on liability for
online providers of computerized information services, another New York
court held otherwise, setting the stage for the introduction of the libel
provisions of the CDA after the decision was handed down in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
18
B. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
By the mid-1990's, Prodigy-like CompuServe before it-was an
online service that featured a host of bulletin boards where more than two
million subscribers could post messages on a wide array of topics,
including publicly traded stocks. 19 In October of 1994, an anonymous
poster uploaded a series of messages to the most widely read board, Money
Talk,20 attacking the securities investment banking firm, Stratton Oakmont,
and its President, Daniel Porush. 21 According to the postings, Porush was
"'soon to be proven criminal' and Stratton Oakmont was a 'cult of brokers
who either lie for a living or get fired.'
22
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of
whether Prodigy could be considered a publisher of the allegedly
defamatory statements posted on the Money Talk board.23 In support of
their motion, Plaintiffs pointed to a series of statements and policies
promulgated by Prodigy. As the court noted, Prodigy boasted of its family-
friendly policies:
PRODIGY held itself out as an online service that exercised
editorial control over the content of messages posted on its
16. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
17. See id. (concluding that an electronic news distributor is the
"computerized... functional equivalent" of "a public library, book store, or newsstand" and
should receive the same "lower standard of liability").
18. 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
19. Id. at *1-2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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computer bulletin boards, thereby expressly differentiating itself
from its competition and expressly likening itself to a
newspaper. (citation omitted) In one article PRODIGY stated:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that
reflects the culture of the millions of American families we
aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper does
less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes,
the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported
gossip its editors tolerate.24
In addition, Plaintiffs pointed to the existence of "content guidelines"
that set forth the parameters of acceptable postings, 25 an automated
screening program that attempted to analyze postings for offensive
language,26 and the "Board Leaders" who had the ability to remove content
that did not comply with the content guidelines.27
In its defense, Prodigy asserted that it changed its practice of
manually reviewing all postings "long before the messages complained of
by Plaintiffs were posted,, 28 and that as a practical matter the sheer volume
of postings-in excess of 60,000 a day-made any manual review
impossible.29 Moreover, Prodigy beseeched the court not to decide an issue
that could "directly impact this developing communications medium
without the benefit of a full record ....
Dismissing Prodigy's concerns, the court noted that the key question
was whether "Prodigy exercised sufficient editorial control over its
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same
responsibilities as a newspaper." 3' In concluding that Prodigy did, the
24. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *2.
25. Id.
26. Id. Reflecting the nafvet of the time, the court accepted this screening ability at face
value-an acceptance that anyone who has attempted to filter out offensive content in e-mails
today would find questionable at best.
27. Id. Interestingly, the guidelines only required content to be removed "when brought to
PRODIGY'S attention." Id.
28. Id. at *3 (citing Schneck affidavit, paragraph 4).
29. Id. Once again, the infeasibility argument was presented to the court, but this time
without success.
30. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3. Prodigy's prayer fell on deaf ears; as
the court noted, Prodigy had failed to "describe what further facts remain to be developed on th[e]
issue of whether it is a publisher." Id. Ironically, another New York state court would
subsequently find that by January of 1994-ten months before these allegedly libelous postings
occurred-Prodigy had indeed abandoned any efforts, and disavowed any ability, to review the
content of its online postings. Lunney v. Prodigy Serv's Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1998) (reversing
the trial court and granting Prodigy summary judgment).
31. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3.
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court focused almost exclusively on Prodigy's prior public pronouncements
of its "family-oriented" policies, and not on its litigation revelations
regarding the limits of its actual capabilities.32 According to the court,
Cubby was not a bar to this action for several reasons:
First, PRODIGY held itself out to the public and its members as
controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards. Second,
PRODIGY implemented this control through its automatic
software screening program, and the Guidelines which Board
Leaders are required to enforce. By actively utilizing technology
and manpower to delete notes from its computer bulletin boards
on the basis of offensiveness and "bad taste," for example,
PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content, and such
decisions constitute editorial control. (citation omitted). That
such control is not complete and is enforced both as early as the
notes arrive and as late as a complaint is made, does not
minimize or eviscerate the simple fact that PRODIGY has
uniquely arrogated to itself the role of determining what is
proper for its members to post and read on its bulletin boards.
Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled to conclude that
for the purposes of Plaintiffs' claims in this action, PRODIGY is
a publisher rather than a distributor.33
While Stratton Oakmont could have been dismissed as a misguided
attempt to hold a corporate defendant accountable for the discrepancy
between its own advertising hype and its actual ability to deliver, the
decision sent shockwaves through the still emerging ISP industry.34
Caught between the desire to encourage average consumers to "get wired"
by touting the benefits of a safe and secure online experience, and the fear
of exposure should their Prodigy-like efforts fall short, the industry turned
to Congress to take the issue away from the courts and provide clarity to
the debate.35 The stage was set for the passage of the CDA.
32. Id at *5.
33. Id. at *4.
34. See Peter H. Lewis, Judge Stands By Ruling on Prodigy's Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1995, at D2 (citing the court's decision as providing the impetus for Congress to grant
immunity for ISP's that filter indecent material).
35. See id.
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III. THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATION OF THE CDA
A. Origins-The 1996 Telecommunications Act
Numerous courts and commentators took exception to the paradoxical
rule advanced by the Stratton Oakmont court. 36 Prodigy was, after all,
being held subject to liability not because it had fostered a breeding ground
for libelous posting, but because it had taken steps-however halting-to
rid itself of such content.37 Rather than encourage conscientious efforts at
self-regulation, the Stratton Oakmont court seemed to incentivize an
entirely "hands-off' attitude toward Internet content by ISPs since, the less
involvement they had with content, the less likely they could be found to
have crossed the divide from distributor to publisher of the allegedly
libelous material.38
The import of such contradictory messages was not lost to the
industry or its supporters in Congress. In direct response to the Stratton
Oakmont ruling, Congressmen Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR)
proposed an amendment to the then-titled Telecommunications Act of
1995, which sought to provide "Online Family Empowerment." 39  The
Cox-Wyden amendment intended to provide a less controversial, but more
effective, means of limiting the spread of online indecency by overruling
the Stratton Oakmont opinion and allowing ISPs to police the content on
their systems without fear of incurring liability if their efforts failed.4° In
36. See, e.g., id at 555 n.136, 138.
37. See, e.g., Lunney, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
38. See Scott Wilson, Corporate Criticism on the Internet: The Fine Line Between
Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 533, 555 n.136 (2002). Curiously, the
Stratton Oakmont court presaged its own overruling, noting that "the issues addressed herein may
ultimately be preempted by federal law if the Communications Decency Act of 1995, several
versions of which are pending in Congress, is enacted." Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv's
Co., 1995 WL 323710 *1, *4 (NY Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
39. 104 CONG. REC. H8468 (1995) (statement of Cong. Cox).
40. House Passes Cox/Wyden 'Internet Freedom' Amendment Major Victory for
Cyberspace-Indecency Statutes Remain a Major Issue, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 4, 1995), at http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp230804.html [hereinafter
C.D. T.]. At the same time that Cox and Wyden were pushing their Online Family Empowerment
amendment, other members of Congress, most notably Senator Exon from Nebraska, were
advocating a more draconian approach to regulating Internet content. Original "Exon
Amendment," EPIC. ORG., at http://www.epoc.org/freespeech/CDA/exon bill.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2004); see also C.D.T Policy Post No. 17-June 14, 1995, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
AND TECHNOLOGY, available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/ppl706l4.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2004). Ultimately, Senator Exon's efforts to criminalize the dissemination of indecent
material on the Internet resulted in the passage of section 223 of the CDA, the provisions that
were later struck down by the Supreme Court. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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comments on the House floor, Congressmen Cox made the connection
explicit:
Prodigy said, "No, no; just like CompuServe, we did not control
or edit that information, nor could we, frankly. We have over
60,000 of these messages each day, we have over 2 million
subscribers, and so you cannot proceed with this kind of case
against us." The court said, "No, no, no, no, you are different;
you are different because you are a family friendly network.
You advertise yourself as such. You employ screening and
blocking software that keeps obscenity off of your
network .... You have content guidelines. You, therefore, are
going to face higher, stricker [sic] liability because you tried to
exercise some control over offensive material."
Mr. Chairman, that is backward. We want to encourage people
like Prodigy... to do everything possible for us, the customer, to
help us control, at the portals of our computer, at the front door
of our house, what comes in and what our children see....
[O]ur amendment will... protect computer Good Samaritans,
online service providers, anyone who ... takes steps to screen
indecency and offensive material for their customers. It will
protect them from taking on liability such as occurred in the
Prodigy case in New York that they should not face for helping
us and for helping us solve this problem.41
Seemingly convinced of this approach, the House passed the Cox-
Wyden amendment 420 to 4.42
Ultimately, a House-Senate conference committee resolved
differences in the competing provisions of what became known as the
Communications Decency Act, and the combined measure passed both
houses of Congress on February 1, 1996. 43 The conference committee's
report affirmed the intent of the Cox-Wyden amendment:
The conference agreement adopts the House provision with
minor modifications as a new section 230 of the
Communications Act. This section provides "Good Samaritan"
protections from civil liability for providers or users of an
41. 104 CONG. REC. H8468.
42. C.D.T., supra note 40.
43. Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress, THOMAS.LOC.GOV, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00652:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Apr.
2, 2004).
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interactive computer service for actions to restrict or to enable
restriction of access to objectionable online material. One of the
specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont
v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated
such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content
that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material. The conferees believe that such
decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy
of empowering parents to determine the content of
communications their children receive through interactive
computer services. 4
As finally enacted, section 230 provides as follows:
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of
offensive material.
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
(2) Civil liability.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of-
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph (1).45
44. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (emphasis added).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996) (codifying the CDA) (citations omitted). In addition, in
original paragraph (e), now codified as paragraph (f), the CDA offered definitions for four terms:
(1) Internet - The term "Internet" means the international computer network of
both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service - The term "interactive computer service" means
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
2004]
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B. Application
Although the debate over the CDA focused on protecting children
from access to indecent material on the Internet, the cases interpreting it
have arisen in the context of liability for publication of defamatory content
over the Internet.
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
The first case to interpret the CDA's section 230 was the sad case of
Kenneth Zeran ("Zeran").46 In the spring of 1995, an anonymous America
Online, Inc. ("AOL") user began posting advertisements on a bulletin
board, operated by defendant AOL, that offered for sale "Naughty
Oklahoma T-Shirts. 47 The poster, identified as "Ken ZZ03," offered t-
shirts that sported a series of offensive slogans related to the Oklahoma
City bombing and invited readers to call "Ken" at Zeran's home phone
number.48 Not surprisingly, "Ken" was inundated with irate callers and it
took some time for Zeran, who did not even have an account with AOL, to
realize the cause of his harassment. Once he did, Zeran contacted AOL and
demanded that they take down the inflammatory postings and, in their
place, post a retraction.49 Although AOL agreed to take down the postings,
it refused to post a retraction.5°
To Zeran's dismay, the removal of the initial postings brought little
relief as they were immediately followed by similar postings for even more
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider- The term "information content provider" means
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.
(4) Access software provider - The term "access software provider" means a
provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools that do
any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize,
reorganize, or translate content.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f). Notably missing from this minimal set of definitions is any definition
of the term "user"--an oversight that, as we shall see, has lead to substantial confusion.
46. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 129 F.3d 327
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
47. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1127.
48. Id. Some of the slogans included: "Visit Oklahoma... It's a BLAST!!!", "Putting the
kids to bed... Oklahoma 1995," and "McVeigh for President 1996." Id. at 1127 n.3.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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offensive products. 51 Again, Zeran was bombarded with irate phone calls
and again Zeran contacted AOL.52 Although AOL agreed to take steps to
block the postings, similar false advertisements continued to appear on
AOL bulletin boards for another five days. 3 The level of abuse directed
toward Zeran was so great that "local police kept [his] house under
protective surveillance. 54 Ultimately, Zeran sued AOL for negligence.55
Zeran asserted that, as a distributor of the libelous postings, AOL had a
duty to prevent the further distribution of postings after having been put on
notice of their false and malicious nature 6
AOL moved for judgment on the pleadings, stating that section 230
provided total immunity from suit for an ISP such as AOL.57 In AOL's
view, this was a simple case. As the CDA precluded treating an ISP "as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider,, 58 and since it was undisputed that AOL was not the
provider of the offensive postings, AOL argued that Zeran's state law tort
action was preempted by the CDA.59
The question before the trial court was: "whether imposing common
law distributor liability on AOL amounts to treating it as a- publisher or
speaker... [and] [i]f so, the state claim is preempted., 60 While the CDA
expressly prohibits treatment as a publisher,6 1 the court concluded that
Zeran's distinguishing of distributor from publisher liability was
misplaced.62 Rather, distributor liability was "merely a species or type of
liability for publishing defamatory material," and thus squarely preempted
by the CDA.63  The Zeran court was clearly concerned that distributor
liability could create a disincentive to remove harmful material. Under
Zeran's theory, such conduct could be interpreted as creating a "reason to
know" of libelous content, and if all such content was not removed,
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1128.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id. at 1126. AOL went so far as to assert that their immunity was so absolute, that even
if they had left the postings up knowing them to be false and with the intent to cause Zeran harm,
they could not be held liable since they were not the original source of the postings. See id. at
1133-34 n.20.
58. Id. at 1129 n.8 (quoting section 203(c)).
59. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1129.
60. Id. at 1133.
61. Id. at 1129 n.8.
62. Seeid. at 1133.
63. Id.
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liability would attach.64 In so concluding, however, the trial court conflated
that which Congress viewed as separate, and immunized knowing
conduct-that is, doing nothing about offensive content-that the CDA
65was intended to eliminate.
The hapless Zeran fared no better on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
66
Adopting the trial court's conflation of publisher and distributor to Zeran's
detriment, the Fourth Circuit concluded:
To the extent that decisions like Stratton and Cubby utilize the
terms "publisher" and "distributor" separately, the decisions
correctly describe two different standards of liability. Stratton
and Cubby do not, however, suggest that distributors are not also
a type of publisher for purposes of defamation law.
Zeran simply attaches too much importance to the presence
of the distinct notice element in distributor liability. The simple
fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law. To the contrary,
once a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially
defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional
publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether
to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran
seeks to impose liability on AOL for assuming the role for
which § 230 specifically proscribes liability-the publisher
role.67
Of course, Zeran was not seeking to impose liability on AOL because
of actions taken, but rather, because of actions it could have taken but
failed to do.6 8 If Congress intended the CDA to incentivize ISPs to police
the content of their systems, Zeran suggested that either the incentive was
insufficient or courts were too willing to interpret the CDA's plain text
apart from the context that spawned it.
69
2. Blumenthal v. Drudge
The next major test of the extent of the CDA's immunization from
liability came in the somewhat more celebrated case of Blumenthal v.
64. Id. at 1135.
65. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1135 n.24.
66. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
67. Id. at 332-33.
68. See id. at 328.
69. After all, the basis for granting the immunity in the first place was to protect those ISPs
that had "restricted access to objectionable material." See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458.
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Drudge.70 In 1997, Sidney Blumenthal was an operative in the Clinton
Administration. 71 As such, he became a target for attack by the more
extreme elements of the Republican Party, including the defendant, Matt
Drudge. Drudge then, as now, is the creator of a web-based scandal sheet
called the Drudge Report.72 In August of that year, Drudge published a
report alleging that "[n]ew White House recruit Sidney Blumenthal has a
spousal abuse past that has been effectively covered up."' 73 Blumenthal
denied the accusations and, along with his spouse, sued both Drudge as the
author and AOL as the publisher of the libelous report.74 AOL moved for
summary judgment asserting immunity under the CDA.75
At first glance this might appear to be Zeran all over again, but the
Blumenthal case had one more factor that complicated the analysis. AOL
had a contractual arrangement with Drudge by which it paid him $3,000
per month-Drudge's sole income at the time- 76 to carry his reports, and
retained the right to "remove, or direct [Drudge] to remove, any content
which, as reasonably determined by AOL... violates AOL's then-standard
Terms of Service .... In other words, AOL reserved to itself the right
to act as a publisher in determining whether content offered by Drudge met
AOL's editorial standards.78
As Blumenthal stressed to the court, "the Washington Post would be
liable if it had done what AOL did here-'publish Drudge's story without
doing anything whatsoever to edit, verify, or even read it (despite knowing
what Drudge did for a living and how he did it)'...."79 But, the court
concluded, such arguments had been "rendered irrelevant by Congress.9
80
Clearly sympathetic to the Blumenthals' plight, the court concluded that it
had no options:
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with
plaintiffs. AOL has certain editorial rights with respect to the
content provided by Drudge and disseminated by AOL,
70. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
71. See id. at 46 (noting Sidney Blumenthal's role as "Assistant to the President of the
United States").
72. See id at 47.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 46-50. In the same opinion, Drudge moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Id. at 53. His motion was ultimately denied. Id. at 58.
76. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
77. Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 49.
80. Id.
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including the right to require changes in content and to remove
it; and it has affirmatively promoted Drudge as a new source of
unverified instant gossip on AOL. Yet it takes no responsibility
for any damage he may cause. AOL is not a passive conduit like
the telephone company, a common carrier with no control and
therefore no responsibility for what is said over the telephone
wires. Because it has the [right] to exercise editorial control
over those with whom it contracts and whose words it
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the
liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book
store owner or library, to the liability standards applied to a
distributor. But Congress has made a different policy choice by
providing immunity even where the interactive service provider
has an active, even aggressive role in making available content
prepared by others. In some sort of tacit quid pro quo
arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has
conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet
service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and
other offensive material, even where the self-policing is
unsuccessful or not even attempted.8'
What seems to have been overlooked in Blumenthal was that the
CDA's language calls for prohibiting a provider, like AOL, from being
"treated as" a publisher as a result of distributing content that it receives
from others. In other words, the CDA says AOL cannot be converted into
a publisher just because it hosts Drudge's report. But when an ISP is, in
the first instance, acting as the publisher, the CDA does not apply, because
no conversion is involved.
Nevertheless, the net effect of Zeran and Blumenthal was to establish
that-at least for providers of interactive computer services-the
immunization from tort liability offered by the CDA was unbounded.83
While it could well be argued that no such immunity for inaction was
intended by Congress, it would not be the first time that Congressional
intent and Congressional action failed to coincide. Left undecided,
81. Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
82. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (stating that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider").
83. See, e.g., Barrett v. Clark, No. 833021-5, 2001 WL 881259, *9 (Cal. Sup. July 25, 2001)
(interpreting the CDA as providing complete immunity for certain communications on the
Internet), vac 'd in part, aff'd in part sub nom. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379,
1394-95 (2004) (commenting that the Zeran court's analysis of the CDA is flawed and such
broad immunity from liability for ISP's is unwarranted).
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however, was the extent to which the CDA's immunization would apply to
users of such services.
IV. USER LIABILITY AND THE BARRETT OPINIONS
Recently, two California state courts have grappled with the CDA's
applicability to user liability and have reached conflicting results.
84
Unfortunately, neither Barrett court has managed to reach the right result
for the right reason.
A. The Facts of Barrett
Plaintiffs and appellants Stephen Barrett and Terry Polevoy are
medical doctors "primarily engaged in combating the promotion and use of
'alternative' or 'nonstandard' healthcare practices and products., 85 Toward
that end, they both maintain web sites that attempt to expose what they
deem to be "health frauds and quackery," and through their writings they
have attained a certain level of notoriety, particularly among the proponents
of the methods that they attack.86 One of those proponents, defendant and
respondent Illena Rosenthal, "direct[ed] the Humantics Foundation for
Women, and participate[d] in two Usenet 'newsgroups,' which focus[ed]
on 'alternative medicine."' 87 By all accounts, Rosenthal was a prolific-
84. See id.
85. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1382.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1382-83. According to a leading online source, Usenet is defined as:
Usenet... [from 'Users' Network'; the original spelling was USENET, but the
mixed-case form is now widely preferred] A distributed bboard (bulletin board)
system supported mainly by Unix machines. Originally implemented in 1979-1980
by Steve Bellovin, Jim Ellis, Tom Truscott, and Steve Daniel at Duke University, it
has swiftly grown to become international in scope and is now probably the largest
decentralized information utility in existence. As of early 1996, it hosts over 10,000
newsgroups and an average of over 500 megabytes (the equivalent of several
thousand paper pages) of new technical articles, news, discussion, chatter, and
flamage every day.
The New Hackers' Dictionary, OUTPOST9.COM, at
http://www.outpost9.com/reference/jargon/jargon_36.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2004)
(defining "Usenet") [hereinafter New Hackers' Dictionary].
On an unmoderated newsgroup, once a user posts a message, the host to which she is connected
will forward that message to every other host in the network with which it communicates. See,
e.g., Jeffrey M. Taylor, Liability of Usenet Moderator for Defamation Published by Others:
Flinging the Law of Defamation into Cyberspace, FLA. L. REv., 247, 254 (1995). If those
secondary hosts make available the newsgroup to which the message was posted, it will then be
available to all users of those hosts. Id. In any event, each of those secondary hosts will then
forward the message to every other host that they can connect to and so on. Id. In this way, a
posted message can be distributed around the world in very short order, entirely without human
intervention.
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and vitriolic-contributor who posted more than 10,000 messages to those
newsgroups in a two year period.88 Appellants contended that one or the
other of them was mentioned in roughly 200 of those messages, "all of
which were intended to injure their reputations.
'" 89
Barrett and Polevoy brought their libel suit against Rosenthal and a
host of others, but of the 200 allegedly libelous postings, appellants only
identified five as having been posted by Rosenthal.90  In particular,
appellants alleged that in August 2000, Rosenthal posted to "two Usenet
newsgroups an e-mail message she received from another defendant,
Timothy Bolen," which accused Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio
personality and described his conduct as criminal and part of an alleged
"criminal conspiracy." 91 When appellants learned of the message, they
contacted Rosenthal and told her that "it was false and defamatory, asked
that it be withdrawn, and threatened suit if it was not."92 Undeterred,
Rosenthal posted thirty-two additional messages to Usenet newsgroups,
forwarding appellants threat to sue and a copy of Bolen's original allegedly
defamatory message.93 Good to their word, Barrett and Polevoy sued 94 and
Rosenthal moved to dismiss, asserting in part that the CDA provided her
with absolute immunity.
95
B. The Trial Court's Opinion
The allure of Rosenthal's argument is in its utter simplicity: a poster
to an "interactive computer service" must, by necessity, be a "user" of that
service; therefore, the poster cannot be held liable for posting any content
that the poster did not originally create. 96 Put more bluntly, as long as the
poster did not create her libelous content she is immune from any civil
liability based on posting it to the Internet, even if she knew that it was
false and posted it with malicious intent.97 Unfortunately, the trial court in
Barrett adopted precisely that reasoning in dismissing the case:
88. See id. at 1383.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1383-84. Of those five, the trial court found only one of them to be actionable, a
finding undisturbed by the court of appeal, and that is the statement that will be discussed here.
Id. at 1385.
91. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1384.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1383.
95. Barrett, 2001 WL 881259, at *8.
96. See id. at *9.
97. See id.
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It is undisputed that Rosenthal did not "create" or "develop" the
information in defendant Bolen's piece. Thus, as a user of an
interactive computer service, that is, newsgroup, Rosenthal is
not the publisher or speaker of Bolen's piece. Thus, she cannot
be civilly liable for posting it on the Internet. She is immune.
98
Although Barrett complained that such a reading was inconsistent
with the very purpose of the CDA,99 the court found that the only culpable
party under the CDA would be "the person who 'created' the
information."'00 Since that person was not Rosenthal, no liability could
attach.
The problems with this reading of the statute are legion. First,
recalling that the context of the CDA's creation was the desire by Congress
to address the rampant distribution of indecent material over the Internet, 1° 1
this reading would immunize all who contributed to such distribution
except the creator of the content. Thus, a pornographer who created
especially offensive images, but only sold them to a willing audience on a
non-Internet media like CD-ROMs, would never have been subject to the
CDA. But, according to the Barrett court's opinion, if everyone who
purchased one of those CD-ROMs then uploaded the offensive images to
all corners of the Internet, they too would be immune since they were not
the original creators of the content.
Second, as the Conference Committee made clear in their report, the
purpose of granting immunity was to protect from liability those who had
taken affirmative steps to restrict access to objectionable material-not to
shelter those who deliberately disseminated it.' 
02
Third, the basis for ISP protection that first arose with Cubby and
which was a part of every other case, but notably absent here, is the
question of infeasibility and burden. 103 While it would certainly be true
that the ISPs and individual computer hosts involved with forwarding
Rosenthal's messages as part of Usenet would not have been in any
position to monitor those messages for libelous content, no such constraint
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing the purpose of the CDA in § 230(b)(5) "to ensure vigorous enforcement of
federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by
means of computer").
100. Id.
101. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (1996) (stating that it is the policy of the United States to
deter and punish the trafficking of obscenity by means of the computer).
102. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
103. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., v. Prodigy Serv's, Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995).
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applied to Rosenthal. Presumably not every e-mail that hit her inbox was
automatically reposted to a Usenet newsgroup, rather, only those messages
that she herself selected were re-published. This was not a matter of
asserting that the technology itself should not serve to convert a user into a
publisher of another's content-the prohibition in section 230-since, by
any conventional understanding of the term, Rosenthal was already the
publisher of this content.
0 4
In short, the Barrett trial court took the CDA places where Congress
never intended for it to go. While alternative approaches were available to
the court that would have produced a more satisfactory result, they were
not recognized. 10 5 Unfortunately, the California Court of Appeal, while
reaching a better result, created additional problems with its approach.
C. California Court of Appeal-Right Result, Wrong Reason
The California Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order to the
extent that it barred liability for Rosenthal on the basis of CDA
immunity.'0 6 But to reach what was the "right" result, unfortunately the
Court of Appeal apparently felt compelled to revisit Zeran, and in so doing,
found it wanting.107 In a lengthy discussion, the court analyzed the history
of the CDA's establishment, the Cubby and Stratton Oakmont cases, and
concluded that Congress never intended to immunize distributor liability:
The expressed desire to overrule Stratton Oakmont, the absence
of any apparent intent to disturb the effect of the decision in
Cubby, and the statements of Representative Cox, the author of
section 230, are consistent with exclusion of distributor liability
from the statutory immunity. 1
08
But if this is so, then what becomes of the burden argument?
Unfortunately, as the court acknowledged, it had no informed basis to
consider that issue: "Neither the record before us nor any other
information brought to our attention provides an answer to that
question."' 0 9 Of course, this is not surprising since this was a user and not
a provider case, and as noted above, users like Rosenthal are not
confronted with the burden problem. Yet the Court of Appeal opinion
establishes a rule that once again puts ISPs in the business of determining
104. See Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1384.
105. See infra Part V.
106. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1385-86.
107. See id. at 1396.
108. Id. at 1402.
109. Id. at 1404.
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whether challenged content should really be removed, and in so doing,
allows for an Internet-wide heckler's veto on speech.11°
The Court of Appeal defended its rule by citing to numerous critics of
Zeran for the general proposition that the threat of distributor liability to
ISPs is greatly overstated.11' Market forces, reasoned the court, would
prevent an ISP from taking down content without investigation of the
notice since "a service that removes members' postings without any
investigation is likely to get a bad reputation in a community whose first
value is the free flow of information." ' 1 2 Cold comfort that, since it simply
means that ISPs have one more concern, namely the loss of market share,
should they act on too many of their received notices.
Not to worry, the Zeran critics say, since it would be almost
impossible for a plaintiff to prevail in such a suit, and even if she beat the
odds and did, the unlucky loser ISP would "not face a large damage
award."1 3 Of course, this completely overlooks the reasonable reluctance
of any business to set itself up for a wave of repetitive lawsuits. Regardless
of what percentage of those suits actually result in damages, every one of
them involves litigation expense-a factor overlooked by the
commentators cited by the court, but very real to those trying to run an ISP.
The Court of Appeal offered those observations of the debate "only to
note its existence and contours, not to attempt its resolution."
'"14
Nevertheless, the court concluded:
Whether Internet intermediaries should be absolutely immune
for the transmission of defamatory materials online is a matter
we think best left to the Legislature, which has yet to squarely
address the issue. Because section 230 does not "'speak
110. See, e.g., Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (holding inpart that subsection
(d) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223, granted opponents of indecent
speech on the Internet a "veto" and was thereby in violation of the First Amendment). In general,
the notion of a heckler's veto is that a threat of violence can be used as an excuse to curtail
speech. In this context, the heckler need merely assert that a posting or web site contains content
that is libelous and the ISP must either remove the content-thereby limiting the speaker's right
of speech-or risk exposure as a distributor of the content.
I ll. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1407. Although the court professes its neutrality by
stating, "[w]e reemphasize that we take no position on whether distributor liability would unduly
chill online speech," all of the commentaries cited are decidedly one-sided. Id.
112. Id. at 1405 (quoting David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of
the Communication Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV.
147, 176); see also Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1403 (stating "[c]ommon sense dictates that an
ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet when it will suffer no
repercussions from failing to do so.").
113. See Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1405-06 (quoting Sheridan, supra note 112, at 173).
114. See idat 1408 (quoting Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 311 (Cal. 2003)).
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directly' to the question addressed by the common law," and is
capable of more than one construction, we conclude that the
statute should not be interpreted as having abrogated the
common law principle of distributor or knowledge-based
liability.'15
Since "Rosenthal has not alleged any fact that would prevent her from
being subjected to distributor liability under the common law,"'"16 the court
vacated the portion of the trial court's order finding her immune from suit
and remanded the case for further proceedings." 1
7
Thus, while the Court of Appeal found a way to allow potential
liability for Rosenthal's posting of allegedly libelous content'" 8-- certainly
the right result-it did so by creating a rule in California which, if broadly
applied, would impose substantial new burdens on ISPs and expose them to
the threat of ever more lawsuits. Yet all of this occurs in a case where no
ISP was even a party to the lawsuit. 19
Fortunately, there is a way to interpret the CDA that allows
intentional wrongdoers to be held liable, while giving due deference to the
burden argument that has been the core motivation for protections in this
field since Cubby was decided more than a decade ago.
V. DECIDING BARRETT CORRECTLY-THE ROLE OF THE USER
A. Three Possible Lines of Attack
There are three ways to reach the right result in Barrett. Briefly
stated, they are:
1. Distinguish distributor liability from publisher liability-as
the Court of Appeal did-but that approach unduly burdens ISPs
and could dampen free speech. As we have seen that is not a
particularly attractive option.
2. Determine that a poster-like Rosenthal-is actually a
developer of the content.
3. Refine the concept of a "user" in the context of online
computer services.
115. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1409-10 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
116. Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1410.
117. Seeid. at 1410-11.
118. Id. at 1410.
119. Seeid. at 1382-83.
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While the last two approaches offer a more attractive solution than
that adopted by the Court of Appeal, only the third approach holds real
promise and is firmly founded on the realities of how these systems are
used. In order to demonstrate why the third approach is preferable, it is
informative to consider how the second approach was recently applied by
the Ninth Circuit.
In Batzel v. Smith, 120 the Ninth Circuit considered the question of
liability for a user who operated a listserv and a web site. The user in
question, co-defendant Cremers, published a newsletter regarding stolen art
work that he distributed through a listserv and posted to his web site. 12' At
issue in the case was an e-mail message Cremers received from Smith in
which he made allegedly libelous comments about Batzel.122 Cremers took
Smith's message, edited it into his newsletter and published it via both the
listserv and his web site. 123  Given that Cremers exercised complete
editorial control over the content of what he distributed over the Internet,
the trial court denied his motion to dismiss (based on California's anti-
SLAPP statute), 124 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Cremers immune
based on the CDA.1
25
The Ninth Circuit quickly concluded that Cremers was a "user" under
the statute. 126 Thus, the only question was "whether Smith was the sole
content provider of his e-mail, or whether Cremers can also be considered
to have 'creat[ed]' or 'develop[ed]' Smith's e-mail message forwarded to
the listserv.' 27 While it was undisputed both that Cremers had complete
editorial discretion in deciding whether to post Smith's message, 128 and that
Cremers had edited the message before including it in his publication, such
actions did not "rise to the level of 'development."", 129 The court held that
since the CDA prohibits treating someone as a publisher, it stands to reason
that exercising the activities of being a publisher are not sufficient to
120. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
121. See id. at 1020-22. The court noted that "[a] listserv is an automatic mailing list
service that amounts to an e-mail discussion... subscribers receive and send messages that are
distributed to all others on the listserv .... " Id. at 1021 n.2.
122. See id. at 1022.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1023.
125. Id. at 1034-35.
126. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030-31 (finding that Cremers' website and listserv both use
interactive computer services and thus are users).
127. Id. at 1031. See also, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996) (defining "information content
provider").
128. Id. at 1031.
129. Id.
2004]
474 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:453
extinguish the immunity. The court explained that "the exclusion of
'publisher' liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual
prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit
the material published while retaining its basic form and message."'
130
The opinion drew a sharp dissent by Judge Gould who also dissented
from the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc.'3' Turning to the plain
meaning of "develop," Judge Gould argued that by making the content of
Smith's message widely available by posting it on the web, he satisfied the
classic meaning.132 Moreover, the act of placing the message into a new
context changed the import of the message, and again served to "develop"
it:
There should be little doubt, given ordinary usage that Congress
presumably intended, that a publisher's affirmative choice to
select certain information for publication for the first time on the
Internet "develops" that information. To put the point more
concretely, imagine a defamatory e-mail sent to both an on-line
bulletin board for appellate litigation and to a popular appellate
litigation blog. Let us say, for example, that the e-mail falsely
stated that Judge X of the Y Circuit was paid by Z to render
decisions in Z's favor. If the blogger decides to publish the e-
mail, there is something qualitatively different about the e-mail
as published on the appellate blog, as contrasted with the one
posted on the bulletin board. The blogger's conscious decision
to publish an e-mail would add, by virtue of his or her reputation
and that of the blog, a layer of credibility and endorsement that
would be lacking from the e-mail merely posted to the bulletin
board. And being the first person to post the defamatory material
on the Internet would be a novel presentation of the defamatory
material. 
33
While Judge Gould's approach makes more sense than the majority's,
it does not account for a case-like Barrett-where little or no editing of
130. Id. Once again, a court overlooked the point that the CDA was seeking to prevent
providers and users from being converted into publishers-not to immunize those who already
were publishers in their own right.
131. See id. at 1036; see also Batzel v. Smith, 351 F.3d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 2003) (dissenting
from the denial of rehearing and rehearing en bane) (Gould, J., dissenting).
132. See Batzel, 351 F.3d at 906.
133. Id. at 906 (citations omitted). Interestingly, although Judge Gould cites to a number of
representative blogs, he does not define the term. The term "blog" can be defined as "[s]hort for
web log; usually a chronological record of thoughts, links, events, or actions posted on the web."
Walt Howe, Walt's Internet Glossary, WALT HOWE.COM (Sept. 10, 2003), at
http://www.walthowe.com/glossary/b.html#blog.
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the libelous message was performed by the reposter, and where there was
nothing transformative in the further distribution, as suggested in the
dissent's "appellate blog" example. Rather, a more comprehensive
approach is needed, and to achieve that end, one must take a closer look at
the roles of users.
B. Users on a Continuum-The Many Roles of a User
1. The Many Meanings of a User
The CDA defines very few terms, and user is not one of them.134 For
the few courts and litigants that have considered the question, the term
"user" has never meant more than the standard dictionary definition of "one
that uses."'135 But that definition is devoid of context, and therefore too
general to offer meaningful guidance. More specifically, the CDA covers
"user[s] of an interactive computer service."' 136 To understand who those
persons are-and who they are not-for purposes of the CDA, it is
necessary to examine the term more closely.
There are several sources of definitions of terms in the field of
interactive computer services. The oldest and most venerable was
compiled from computer slang used at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Stanford University, and other early participants in what was
then known as the ARPANET (predecessor of today's Internet) starting in
the 1960s.' That compilation was known originally as The Jargon File
and later as The Hackers' Dictionary. 138 In that context, the term "user"
has a variety of meanings, for example:
user /n./
1. Someone doing 'real work' with the computer, using it
as a means rather than an end. Someone who pays to use a
computer. See real user. 2. A programmer who will believe
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
135. From what is reflected in both the Barrett and Batzel opinions, none of the litigants
ever challenged whether either Rosenthal or Cremers were "users" under the CDA. See, e.g.,
Batzel v. Smith, 351 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2003); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379
(2004).
136. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
137. New Hacker's Dictionary the Jargon File v. 4.4.6, JARGON.ARTROCITY.COM, (Oct. 25,
2003) at http://jargon.artrocity.com/revision-history.html.
138. See id See also New Hackers' Dictionary, OUTPOST9.COM, at
http://www.outpost9.com/reference/jargon/jargon-27.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). In this
parlance, "hacker" was a term of honor and prestige, pre-dating its more recently acquired,
pejorative connotations. See id.
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anything you tell him. One who asks silly questions...
See luser. 3. Someone who uses a program from the
outside, however skillfully, without getting into the
internals of the program. One who reports bugs instead of
just going ahead and fixing them.
The general theory behind this term is that there are two
classes of people who work with a program: there are
implementors (hackers) and lusers. The users are looked
down on by hackers to some extent because they don't
understand the full ramifications of the system in all its
glory.
39
The subspecies of "real users" is defined as:
real user /n./
1. A commercial user. One who is paying real money for
his computer usage. 2. A non-hacker. Someone using the
system for an explicit purpose (a research project, a course,
etc.) other than pure exploration.14 °
And the more pejorative "luser" as:
luser /loo'zr/ /n./
A user; esp. one who is also a loser. 141
While perhaps not offering the most "user-friendly" set of definitions,
these early usages clearly indicate that not all users are alike, and that their
differences can be significant.
More recently, other online sources have arisen to provide guidance
on the term "user," providing a myriad of concatenations ranging from
"naYve-user" to "power-user" to "end-user," 142 with each definition
providing additional support for rejecting the one-size-fits-all conception
assumed by the courts.
Thus, a "na've-user" is defined as:
A luser. Tends to imply someone who is ignorant mainly
owing to inexperience. When this is applied to someone
who has experience, there is a definite implication of
139. New Hacker's Dictionary, at
http://www.outpost9.com/reference/jargon/jargon_36.html (defining "user").
140. New Hacker's Dictionary, at
http://www.outpost9.com/reference/jargon/jargon33.html (defining "real user").
141. New Hacker's Dictionary, at
http://www.outpost9.com/reference/jargon/jargon_27.html (defining "luser").
142. See OneLook Dictionary Search, ONELOOK.COM, at
http://www.onelook.com/?w = **user** (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
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stupidity.1
43
Whereas, a "power-user" is:
A sophisticated user of personal computers. A power user
is typically someone who has considerable experience with
computers and utilizes the most advanced features of
applications.44
But, most illuminating of all, is the definition of an "end-user":
In information technology, the term end user is used to
distinguish the person for whom a hardware or software
product is designed from the developers, installers, and
servicers of the product .... The term end user thus
distinguishes the user for which the product is designed
from other users who are making the product possible for
the end user. Often, the term user would suffice.14
5
When placed in the definitional context of interactive computer
services, as set forth in the CDA, the term "user" is properly understood to
encompass a broad continuum of experience levels, technological
sophistication, and responsibility.'46 It is within that continuum that the
proper meaning of "users" is to be found-amid the many roles users
assume.
2. Distilling Meanings into Roles
The continuum of meanings developed above can be distilled into a
discrete set of roles that users assume from time to time. 147 Specifically, it
is easy to identify at least four distinct roles that a "user" might assume:
143. See New Hacker's Dictionary, at http://ouqps9.com/reference/jargon/jargon_29.html
(defining "naive-user").
144. See Webopedia, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at
httpJ/www.webopedia-com/TERMhu/power_user.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (defining
"power-user').
145. See Whatis.com Target Search, WHATIS.COM, at
http://whatis.techtargetcom/definition/O,,sid9_gci212063,00.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2004)
(defining "end-user").
146. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2) (defining "interactive computer service"); see also
Webopedia, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.webopedia.comTERM/u/user.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2004) (defining "user").
147. To be sure, these roles are in no way mutually exclusive or permanent- An individual
may assume many different roles at different times or on different computer systems.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, for purposes of analyzing liability under the CDA, the proper
analytic approach is to determine the role the defendant was assuming in connection with the
particular incident. See generally Taylor supra note 87, at 268-70 (describing the different roles
and accompanying liability of the Usenet moderator).
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Reader, Poster, Moderator, and Administrator.
1 48
a. Readers
On one end of the continuum are Readers-users who simply read the
contents of postings provided by others. These are likely end-users who
may or may not also be "naive-users;" but at bottom, this role merely
reflects an involvement with the system that requires very little specialized
skill, and no responsibility for the introduction onto the Internet of the
content being read. Certainly Congress was not worried about Readers
when it included the term "user" into the immunity provision of the CDA,
since no legal theory supports civil liability simply for reading someone
else's postings.
49
b. Administrators
At the continuum's other end are Administrators-sophisticated users
who are employed by the provider of the interactive computer service to
keep it running. Other terms used to describe users in this role would be
"super-user" (a Unix term), 150 or "sysadmin" (a network term), 151 or
"sysop" (a bulletin board term). 15 2 Users in this role are strictly technical
resources; as a general rule, they do not make policy for a provider-they
simply implement it.' 53 As employees or agents of the provider, they are
sheltered under the provider's immunity, and thus, they too could not be
148. See discussion infra pp. 125-28.
149. The distinction between civil and criminal liability is an important one. Certain
criminal statutes make it a crime to knowingly possess-i.e., receive-certain content, such as
child pornography, which is frequently distributed over the Internet. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 2252(4)(B) (2004).
150. Rob Slade 's Security Glossary, SUN.SOCI.NIU.EDU, at
http://sun.soci.niu.edu/-rslade/secgloss.htm. (last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (defining "super-user" as
"a user with full and unrestricted access to all aspects and resources of the system. Frequently
referred to, particularly in UNIX circles where it is the name of the privileged account").
151. See Computer, Telephony & Electronics Industry Glossary, CSGNETWORK.COM, at
http://www.csgnetwork.com/glossarys.html. (last visited Feb. 16, 2004) (defining "sysadmin" as
"[t]he administrator of a network, sometimes called Angel, a notch below the network God; the
person who is responsible for the network operation and fixes the problems on a daily basis").
152. See Matisse's Glossary of Internet Terms, MATISSE.NET, at
http://www.matisse.net/files/glossary.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004) (defining "sysop" (system
operator) as "[alnyone responsible for the physical operations of a computer system or network
resource. For example, a System Administrator decides how often backups and maintenance
should be performed and the System Operator performs those tasks").
153. See generally Taylor, supra note 87, at 251-52 (limiting the responsibility of network
administrators to providing technical support at individual Internet.sites).
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the users Congress was expressly seeking to protect.154
c. Moderators
Moderators and Posters occupy the middle of the continuum, and in
failing to recognize and distinguish these two roles, the Barrett court
missed the point. Moderators are users who employ a provider's
interactive computer service to create and oversee a forum in cyberspace
such as a public discussion bulletin board, a moderated Usenet newsgroup,
or an interactive web site where third parties can contribute content to be
published to the Internet. 155
Within the role of Moderator there can be many degrees of
involvement with the content published. At one extreme, the Moderator
might simply create, using the interactive computer service of the provider,
a forum for hosting content without ever reviewing the content before its
distribution. 156  For example, a Moderator might create one or more
listservs on a particular topic. 57 The Moderator could control who has
posting rights or reception rights, but still never review or even see the
majority of the content distributed via the listserv.1 58 Or, as was the case
with Cremers, the Moderator could review every submission, and even edit
them before making their content available on the Internet.159 Whatever the
degree of involvement with third-party content, the Moderator's role is
most likely to share the provider's burden argument since, as the volume of
contributions rises, the ability to fact check in advance, or even depublish
upon notice, becomes ever more burdensome. 60 If exposed to liability for
all content so published, the Moderator must become cautious to the point
where free speech via the forum provided could be impaired.
Thus, the Moderators' role is the one most like, yet distinct from, that
of the provider. It is the role of Moderator that is most in need of immunity
from a publisher-distributor theory of liability in a manner consistent with
154. Seeid at 286.
155. See Webopedia, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at
http://webopedia.com/TERM/m/moderated-newsgroup.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) (defining
"moderated newsgroup"). Of course, the Moderator might also contribute content, but in that case
the role shifts to that of Poster. See discussion infra pp. 127-28.
156. See, e.g., L-SoFT INTERNATIONAL, INC., GENERAL USER'S GUIDE FOR LISTSERV
VERSION 1.8c, available
at http://www.lsoft.com/manuals/1.8e/user/user.pdf, at 7-8 (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
157. See generally id. at 5 (defining the term "listserv").
158. See Taylor, supra note 87, at 254.
159. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022.
160. See generally Sheridan, supra note 112, at 177-78 (noting the lack of resources
available for a moderator to screen the content of postings before they are distributed).
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the stated purposes of the CDA.
d. Posters
The final role is that of Poster-a user who takes content, either of
161
their initial creation or from third parties, and publishes it on the Internet.
A Poster is distinguished from a Moderator in that the Moderator is
charged with processing the submissions of others; a Poster has no such
duty. 162 Instead, the Poster publishes third-party content for the Poster's
own purposes, not as part of a commitment to provide a forum for others.
63
Nor do Posters face the burden issue that argues for treating providers and
Moderators alike, since, by definition, a Poster is not the target of mass
submissions like the Moderator. To the contrary, a Poster has a far greater
ability to select the material being posted with an eye for possibly libelous
content, and to remove such postings upon notice.
164
For Posters, the users who make objectionable content available
online, there can be no entitlement to the CDA's immunity since their
conduct is in direct conflict with the stated purposes of the CDA. 165  To
hold otherwise would enable a Poster of third-party-created objectionable
material-say an offensive photograph of a celebrity doctored to appear as
if she were engaged in illicit sexual conduct-to be immune from liability
by virtue of the CDA. It defies all logic to conclude that the same
provision that shelters the ISP for taking down the offensive image would
also provide a safe harbor to the image's Poster. To the contrary, Congress
was immunizing providers and those users engaged in complimentary, not
conflicting, conduct.
166
C. Applying the Role-Driven Analysis to Barrett
Applying this role-driven analysis to the facts in Barrett allows a
161. Webopedia, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://webopedia.com/TERM/p/poster.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2004) (defining "poster"). A Poster who creates original content has a role
synonymous with the CDA's definition of an "information content provider," and is therefore not
entitled to the CDA's immunity. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3). A Poster who takes content from
third parties and publishes it to the Internet is the focus of this analysis.
• 162. See generally Beth Simone Novek, Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace:
The Role of the Cyber Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 1, 40 (2003) (describing structure of
online interaction).
163. See id.
164. See generally Taylor, supra note 87, at 275 (describing the burden on moderators to
screen all content for defamatory material as nearly impossible).
165. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
166. See id § 230(c)(2).
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court to reach the right result without doing violence to the necessary
immunity for ISPs that are genuinely threatened by the unavoidable
burdens arising from potential distributor liability. Since Barrett is a case
turning solely on the conduct of an individual user, 167 no provider
analysis-such as that engaged in by the Court of Appeal-need be
conducted. Rather, we must simply determine Rosenthal's role as a user.
Nothing in the admittedly scanty record disclosed in the two reported
opinions suggests that Rosenthal was anything other than a Poster.
Moreover, once Rosenthal received word from Barrett that her original
posting of the Bolen e-mail was libelous, she posted a new message
containing Barrett's threat of suit along with her original posting.
68
Collectively, those actions suggest strongly that Rosenthal was-for
purposes of these communications-acting in a role that is incompatible
with CDA immunity. Accordingly, and on that basis, the libel case against
her should have been allowed to proceed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history and purpose of the CDA's immunity provisions
demonstrate the desire to allow ISPs to take a proactive role in regulating
online content without being transformed into publishers for purposes of
civil liability. The fundamental justification for such immunity was a
simple acknowledgement that no such actions could ever be complete or
foolproof given the enormous volume of content flowing through ISPs on a
daily basis. 169 Further credence to this view is provided by recalling that
Congress sought to leave undisturbed Cubby, where the burden argument
was recognized, while overruling Stratton Oakmont, where the burden
argument was ignored.1 70 As a result, courts have concluded that ISPs have
a literal "get out of jail free" card when it comes to such liability,17' and in
the interests of unfettered free speech on the Internet, those conclusions-
though occasionally producing unpalatable results-are justified.
167. See Barrett, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 1384.
168. Id. Even assuming, arguendo, that Rosenthal served as a Moderator with regard to the
original distribution of the Bolen e-mail-since it is possible that he sent the content to her as a
true third-party submission which she simply redistributed, her subsequent posting of the threat of
suit concatenated with her prior message took her out of the Moderator role and into that of
Poster.
169. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1407 (2004) (noting that "almost all
of those who commented on Cubby viewed its imposition of distributor liability as the correct
legal rule choice").
170. See id. at 1401-02.
171. See id. at 1404.
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Unfortunately, the inclusion of the term "users" in that same
immunity provision has created unnecessary confusion where courts seek
to apply conventional meanings to a term that is actually rich in nuance in
the field of "interactive computer systems." When viewed in that context,
it is clear that users occupy roles, and that only one of those roles-the
Moderator-reflects the same policy choices inherent in the CDA's
immunity for providers. More notably, the role of Poster-such as that
occupied by Rosenthal in the Barrett case-is not worthy of immunity
under the CDA. Under the analysis advanced here, Poster-users who
maliciously republish libelous content over the Internet will not be able to
use the CDA to shield them from liability.
